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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 8703 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE PROCEEDING BELOW 
Appellant, Percy Mounteer, ("Mounteer") filed an acti 
in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, again 
respondant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L") alleging that 
UP&L was liable for damages for slander and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress committed by Niki Larsen 
("Larsen"), one of its employees while Larsen was acting within 
the scope of her employment. This Appeal is from an Order of 
Dismissal by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge of The Thir 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by 
virtue of Utah Code Annotated §78-2-3(i)(1987) and §78-2(a)-3 a: 
an appeal in a civil matter from a final ruling or judgment of < 
District Court in which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is an employer liable in tort for defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by its employee upon 
a fellow employee when the offending employee is acting in the 
scope of her actual or apparent authority? 
2. In granting a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may a Court make 
findings of fact upon which to base the granting of the motion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal from an Order of Dismissal granted 
under a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. Mounteer, the plaintiff 
below, had alleged that UP&L was liable for slander and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress perpetrated by its 
employee Larsen while Larsen was acting within the scope of her 
actual or apparent authority. The Court below granted UP&L's 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) holding that an employer is 
not vicariously liable for intentional acts of the employee and 
that the employer is not liable for the slander of one employee 
by another unless the employee was speaking with the employer's 
actual knowledge or approval. The Court found that the acts of 
Larsen were in violation of UP&L policy and that UP&L did not 
direct Larsen to make the defamatory statements. The findings 
regarding violation of company policy and that Larsen was not 
directed to make the statements are believed by Mounteer to be 
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findings of fact improperly made by the Court in granting the 
12(b)(6) Motion. The Court also held that Utah law does not 
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotion 
distress. This last holding has not been appealed. The matter 
was urged below in a good faith effort to seek reversal of a 
prior precedentf but because appeal of that issue could unduly 
complicate and lengthen the appeal process, it has been abandon 
insofar as this appeal is concerned and will not be raised agai 
in this case. 
The order dismissing Mounteerfs action was granted 
without prejudice (Record page 126, hereinafter "R. ") 
apparently to allow Mounteer to file an action against Larsen 
However, since Mounteer has chosen not to file against Larsen, 
the order of the District Court has become a final order and cai 
be reviewed by this Court. The Complaint, the Court's Minute 
Entry and its Order of Dismissal are all attached as addenda 
hereto. 
The following are the relevant facts, as set forth in 
the pleadings of Mounteer, and must be deemed admitted for 
purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Case: 
1. On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was workinc 
at a mine in Emery County, as an employee of Utah Power & Light 
Company ("UP&L"). R. 3. 
2. On the date in question, plaintiff was in a 
substantially elevated state of stress because of his prior 
involvement in the Wilberg mine disaster of December, 1984, and 
various events that occurred subsequent to that disaster that 
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involved Mounteer. R. 3-4. 
3. UP&L employed Larsen as a security officer. 
Larsen, as an agent of UP&L, was instructed by UP&L to 
investigate Mounteer for possible drug use. R. 2, 4. 
4. While in the course of her assignment to conduct a 
drug investigation, Larsen interviewed Mounteer on the mine 
premises on or about October 6, 1986. R. 2, 4. 
5. After a short interview wherein Mounteer denied any 
drug use, Larsen spoke to a mine superintendent over a company 
loudspeaker and accused Mounteer of being on drugs. Many other 
employees heard the allegations over the loudspeaker that went 
throughout the entire mine. Mounteer suffered considerable 
damage because of the allegations. The allegations were false. 
R. 2, 4. 
6. All of the actions of Larsen were within the 
scope of her actual or apparent authority as granted by her 
principal, UP&L. R. 2, 4. 
7. The court dismissed the action on the grounds that 
UP&L is not liable for the actions of its employee, Larsen, 
unless UP&L actually directed her to make defamatory statements. 
Order of Dismissal, R. 126. 
8. UP&L also raised the issue of a bar by Worker's 
Compensation, but the court does not appear to have based its 
decision upon that particular issue. R. 17-18, 126. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UP&L is liable for defamation and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by virtue of the actions of its 
employee Larsen against fellow employee Mounteer. The injury 
caused to Mounteer by UP&L's employeef Larsen, is not an injury 
arising from an "accident" in the course of employment as define* 
in Utah statute and case law. It is, therefore, outside the 
exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act and 
is justiciable before a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The issue presented in this case is whether Mounteer 
may pursue a cause of action against his employer UP&L for the 
slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
committed by a fellow employee, Larsen, while she was engaged in 
an activity specifically initiated and directed by UP&L. The 
Court's order below holds that unless UP&L specifically directed 
the injurious action itself, it does not bear responsibility for 
its employees' actions even though those actions were carried out 
in furtherance of the a directive. Larsen was the agent of UP&L 
and her actions in carrying out the investigation of Mounteer for 
alleged drug abuse were in direct response to the directive of 
UP&L. Whether Larsen carried out that directive within the 
guidelines established by UP&L is irrelevant to the issue of 
liability. So long as the employee's intentions were to fulfill 
her obligation as an employee of UP&L, she was operating within 
the scope of her authority as UP&L's employee. UP&L is, 
therefore, vicariously liable for any tortious conduct which she 
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may have committed in that capacity. 
UP&L's position is that unless the slander and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress were done 
specifically at the request of UP&Lf UP&L bore no responsibility. 
In the cases cited by UP&L, the offending employee abandoned the 
purpose of serving the employer and sought to serve his own in 
injuring or assaulting a fellow employee. The fact that the 
assault or injury took place upon a fellow employee or upon the 
employer's premises or during working hours was simply a matter 
of coincidence. In those cases, the employer may not be held 
liable for the intentional tort of a fellow employee. However, 
in this case Larsen's entire reason for performing the acts 
complained of herein were in furtherance of her duties and 
responsibilities as a UP&L employee and were not motivated in any 
way by a desire to serve her own motives or purposes. Therefore, 
UP&L, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is liable for 
the acts of its employee even though the employee may have 
performed those acts in a manner contrary to company policy. 
In entering its Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, 
the Court included within its order items which are apparently 
findings of fact and upon which the Court appears to have based 
its order. Such findings of fact are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss since there is no evidence presented to the 
Court upon which such findings may be made. Allegations 
contained in plaintiff's Complaint must be assumed admitted for 
purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion. However, any allegations 
contained in the complaint are based upon information and belief 
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since no discovery had occurred at the time the 12(b)(6) Motion 
was filed. Therefore, any possible set of facts that could be 
proven at trial must be weighed in favor of a plaintiff resisting 
a 12(b)(6) Motion, The order of the Court entered in this mattei 
is, therefore, manifest error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT UP&L IS LIABLE FOR THE SLANDER 
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS OF 
ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHILE THAT EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
The main issue in this appeal is whether UP&L, as an 
employer, is liable for the slander and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress committed by an employee acting within the 
scope of her actual or apparent authority. 
The court below based its dismissal on the fact that 
UP&L allegedly did not specifically direct Larsen, a security 
guard engaged in the performance of a UP&L ordered drug 
investigation, to slander or otherwise harm Mounteer. At the 
hearing, the court stated: 
[With reference to paragraph 9 of the 
complaint] But [that] doesn't say 
that she was authorized to go out and 
publish her investigation to anybody or 
to tell the plaintiff here about it, or 
to tell anybody else about it, other than 
to investigate; that's all your allegation 
is. R. 164, Ins. 19-13. 
Now, where did you say in your complaint, 
anywhere, that her authority in that 
investigation was to do anything but 
investigate and report to her superiors? 
R. 165, Ins. 21-23. 
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And what Mr. Proctor is saying is that 
[it] may well be true; but Utah Power & 
Light didn't tell her, in any way, to 
stand upon the roof of the buildings and 
broadcast to the world either that she 
was conducting as a snitch and 
investigator more specifically, that he 
was in fact on drugs. R. 167, Ins 13-18. 
The court took an unduly narrow view on what acts 
advanced the cause of Ms. Larsen's agency stating at one point: 
The problem I see is, that the act of 
which you're complaining in this case, 
and the act we have been talking about in 
these examples, is an intentional act by 
you (sic) [i.e. Ms. Niki Larsen, the 
security officer of UP&L], which does not 
forward the purpose of the agency, which 
was not contemplated in the authority 
given. R. 168, Ins 10.14. 
The court's order of dismissal then recited the 
following: 
Utah Power & Light Company is not liable 
for defamatory statements made by its 
employee against the plaintiff, a 
co-employee, unless Utah Power & Light 
Company directed the employee to make the 
defamatory statements. R. 126, ^  3. 
The District Court's legal reasoning in this case is manifest 
error. If one accepts as true the facts as alleged by Mounteer, 
then one must accept the following: UP&L's agent, Niki Larsen, 
was engaged in a drug investigation at the direction of her 
employer at the time that she slandered Mounteer; and that the 
act of slander was committed in furtherance of that investigation. 
In fact, the slander occurred as Ms. Larsen was reporting to 
another UP&L employee located on the mine property, through a 
public intercom, that Mr. Mounteer was allegedly on drugs. 
Therefore, Larsen was, by definition, performing her employer's 
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errand. 
It is hornbook law that a master is liable for the 
defamation of a servant acting within the scope of his or her 
authority. The Restatement of Agency 2df § 247, provides as 
follows: 
A master is subject to liability for 
defamatory statements made by a servant 
acting within the scope of his 
employment, or, as to those hearing or 
reading the statement, within his 
apparent authority. 
As to when an act is within the scope of the employer 
authority, Comment C of § 247 makes the following relevant 
statement: 
If the master employs a servant to speak 
for him, he is subject to liability if 
the servant makes a mistake as to the 
truth of the words spoken or as to the 
justification for speaking them, or even 
if he speaks with an improper motive, 
provided that he acts at least in part to 
serve his employer's purposes. The 
master may be liable even though the 
servant knows the statement to be untrue, 
as where the manager of a store, for the 
purpose of obtaining an admission from a 
suspected thief, charges such person with 
other similar crimes, although having no 
belief in his own statements. (Emphasis 
Added) 
Id. Comment C, p. 545. Comment E further states the following: 
It may be found to be within the scope of 
employment of a person managing a 
business to accuse another of wrongful 
conduct or to report to others a supposed 
wrongful conduct of an employee or other 
person. A servant having a duty to make 
such reports either to his employer or to 
others, to gather information, or to 
institute proceedings, may subject his 
employer to liability for his untruthful 
statements constituting defamation 
because [it is] made in excess of a 
9 
privilege to speak, if he speaks in 
connection with his employment and with a 
purpose to serve it, (Emphasis Added) 
Id. Comment E, pp. 546-7. The illustrations in the Restatement 
of Agency 2d of this principle are almost precisely on point with 
the facts of this case. Illustration No. 5 reads as follows: 
P employs A as general manager of an 
electric lighting company. Unreasonably 
believing that T, a customer, has been 
stealing electric current, A calls T to 
the office and charges him with this 
before a number of people. This conduct 
is within the scope of A's employment. 
Id. at 547. 
The Restatement of Agency 2d defines "scope of 
employment" in §§ 228 through 235. Generally, conduct is deemed 
to be within the scope of employment if " . . . it is of the kind 
he is employed to perform" and " . . . it is actuated, at least in 
part, by the purpose to serve the master. . ." Restatement of 
Agency 2d, § 228 (Emphasis Added). 
For some reason, the trial court seemed to feel that 
UP&L would bear no liability for Larsen's acts unless UP&L 
actually directed Larsen to specifically slander the plaintiff. 
This is a manifestly erroneous view of the law. The issue is not 
whether UP&L specifically directed Ms. Larsen to make defamatory 
statements; but rather whether the defamatory statements were 
made within the scope of her employment. Conduct is within the 
scope of the employment if it is the kind of work that the 
employee is employed to perform at the authorized time, and if it 
". . . is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve. . ." 
the employer. Restatement of Agency 2d, § 228. The conduct is 
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within the scope of employment if it is of the same general 
nature as "that authorized or incidental to the conduct 
authorized." Restatement of Agency 2d, § 229(1). Ms. Larsen1! 
calling of a supervisory UP&L employee to report Mr. Mounteer'i 
alleged drug use, when she was employed to conduct a drug 
investigation, must be found as a matter of law to be the kind 
conduct that she was employed to perform and in furtherance of 
her assigned duty. In any event, on a motion to dismiss, this 
allegation must be taken as admitted. 
The fact that UP&L may not have wished Larsen to 
perform her duties in that manner, and even the alleged fact t\ 
it may have been beyond company policy, are irrelevant. 
Forbidden acts and acts done in a forbidden manner may still be 
within the scope of employment. Restatement of Agency 2d, § 2: 
UP&L is still liable even though the act of Ms. Larsen was 
tortious. Restatement of Agency 2d, § 231. The Comments 
indicate the following: 
A master cannot direct a servant to 
accomplish a result and anticipate that 
he will always use the means which he 
directs or will refrain from acts which 
it is natural to expect that servants may 
do. 
Restatement of Agency 2d, § 2 30, Comment B. Larsen's conduct 
would be outside the scope of employment if it had "no connecti 
with the act which the employee is required to perform". Id., 
Comment C (Emphasis Added). Since the slander was connected wi 
the acts Larsen was required to perform, UP&L is liable. By 
contrast, if Larsen had stopped at a restaurant on the way to t 
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meeting with plaintiff and injured someone during an altercation, 
that act could be said to have "no connection" with her official 
acts and, thus, would be outside the scope of employment. 
Utah case law is consistent with the principles 
expressed above. In the case of Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court explained the theory of 
respondeat superior as follows: 
However, an employer's liability, which 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
has been termed "secondary" or 
"derivative", arises not as a result of 
any actual negligence by the employer, 
but solely because of the employer's 
employment of the employee. ... The 
employer is liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, not because of the 
employer's actionable fault, but because 
the employee acts for the employer, who 
reaps the benefits of the employee's acts. 
Id. at 1351. Likewise in this case, UP&L is liable not because 
of any negligence or fault of its own, but simply because Larsen 
was acting for UP&L. UP&L reaps the benefit of Larsen's actions 
in the sense that she is performing UP&L's investigation. There 
is no requirement that the employer has to intend the results of 
the employee's conduct. In an ordinary traffic negligence case, 
such as Krukiewicz, the employer never intends that the employee 
operate a vehicle negligently on the highways. In fact, such 
negligent operation of a vehicle may be entirely contrary to 
company policy and may subject the employee to dismissal. 
However, the negligent operation is still within the scope of 
employment and the employer is liable. 
In the case of Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 
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P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff sued a real estate agent anc 
his broker for the improper handling of the sale of a business. 
Among other things, the agent failed to conduct a proper closing 
or have an attorney review the closing papers, and made false 
representations concerning the financial solvency of the buyer, 
which at least were not properly checked out by the agent. The 
broker defended on the grounds that the agent's " . . . acts coul 
not have been within the scope of his employment because they 
were in complete violation of [the broker's] established policie 
and practices." Id., at 882. The broker claimed, in a manner 
similar to UP&L in this case, that the salesman's acts were done 
in furtherance of his own interests and not on behalf of the 
broker. The Court noted that the agent had been employed by the 
broker for some time and was doing the kind of work that he was 
hired to do. Despite the fact that the agent probably violated 
the employer's procedures, the Court nonetheless held the broker 
liable because: 
. . . we hold that [the agent's] tortious 
conduct, with respect to the sale of 
plaintiff's construction business, is 
imputable to [the broker] in its dual 
fiduciary capacity as [the agent's] 
principal and plaintiff's agent. 
Id. at 883. Likewise in this case, Larsen's conduct, even thougl 
tortious and in possible violation of the company's policies, is 
still imputable to UP&L because it was done in furtherance of the 
interests of UP&L. 
Appellant, Mounteer, has found no case which supports 
respondent's position that an employer is not liable for the 
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slander of an employee committed within the scope of the 
employee's agency. Howeverf UP&L defines the issue on appeal 
very imprecisely; i.e., is an employer generally liable for the 
"intentional torts" of the employee? That is unduly broad; more 
precision is needed. Even assuming that the slander in this case 
was an "intentional tort" (an unsupported assumption), it is 
manifest error to lump all intentional torts together. Slander 
is treated much differently by the law than an assault or battery. 
An example of UP&L's broad, imprecise agrument is its 
citation below of the case of Bryan v. Utah International, 533 
P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) in support of its position, R. 13. Bryan is 
an assault and battery case. This case is not applicable to the 
facts in the case at bar for at least two reasons. First, the 
injuries received by the plaintiff in the Bryan case were 
physical injuries caused by an occurrence that came under the 
definition of "accident" under Utah Worker's Compensation Law. 
Therefore, the exclusivity provision would bar such an action 
against the employer in such a case. Second, and perhaps more 
important, in the Bryan case the offending employee entirely left 
the purpose of serving his employer and embarked on a purpose of 
his own, that is to frighten or injure his fellow employee. The 
fact that the incident occurred on the employer's property, 
during working hours or between co-employees, is only a matter of 
coincidence. It is nearly a universal theme among those cases 
which deny an employee the right to sue his employer for an 
intentional tort committed by a fellow employee that the employee 
entirely left the purpose of serving his employer and sought only 
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his own purposes. In the case at barf Larsen had no purpose o 
her own in reporting Mounteer's suspected drug use in such a w 
as to cause injury to Mounteer. Her single purpose was to fol 
the directive of the company in investigating suspected drug u 
by Mounteer. 
UP&L's assault and battery cases cited below are 
fundamentally different from this case. Absent unusual 
circumstances, an assaulting employee could seldom be said to 1 
acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority as 
traditionally defined. The typical case, like the fact situat: 
in Bryanf arises where the offending employee gets in some typ< 
of an altercation with a fellow employee over a non-work relate 
matter. Another common fact situation arises where the offend: 
employee, while at work, gets in an altercation with some thirc 
party over something that has nothing to do with the employer's 
business. Contrast, though, these common fact situations with 
Mounteer's situation. Larsen was sent to Mounteer's work statj 
by her employer on an official drug investigation. UP&L, as 
employer, was the instigator of all of the events which led up 
the incident of slander. Larsen was promoting the employer's 
welfare in investigating the alleged drug use. The means of 
promoting the employer's errand, the calling of a mine supervis 
at the mine, was reasonably within the time and spacial 
requirements of the assigned task. That fact situation is 
vastly different from the fact situation in Bryan where the 
assault was totally non-related to the employment. 
The law and the assumed facts dictate that the trial 
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court committed manifest error in dismissing this action on the 
grounds that the Plaintiff must allege that UP&L directed the 
employee to make the defamatory statements or intended the harm. 
POINT II 
IN RULING ON A 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS, 
THE COURT MAY NOT MAKE FINDINGS OP FACT AND 
BASE ITS ORDER THEREON. 
In the Court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal below, 
the Court in paragraphs 3 and 4 of its order, made what appear to 
the appellant to be Findings of Fact. R. 126. These findings of 
fact entered by the Court in connection with a 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss and upon which the Court has, at least in part, based its 
order of dismissal, are inappropriate. 
The Court's findings in this case, that Larsen's 
actions were in violation of UP&L policy and that UP&L did not 
direct Larsen to make the defamatory statements, appear to be 
directed to a conclusion that Larsen was, at the time of making 
the defamatory statements, not acting within the scope of her 
authority. However, there was no evidence introduced to the 
Court at the stage where the motion to dismiss was granted which 
would allow the court to determine what UP&L company policy was 
or that the direction which Larsen received from her supervisors 
did not encompass the making of the defamatory comments. 
Mounteer had not alleged that such was the case for two reasons. 
First, no discovery had been taken in this case and Mounteer had 
no information upon which to base such allegations at that stage 
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of the proceeding. Second, it is Mounteer's position, as state 
in Point I of this brief, that even if Larsen's actions were in 
violation of UP&L policy or that she was not specifically 
directed to make the slanderous remarks regarding Mounteer, tha 
a cause of action against UP&L still lies. 
Such findings by the Court are inappropriate under 
Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 24 
Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970), because as stated in that cas< 
a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to 
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief und< 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of a claim. 
It is certainly reasonable to assume that in discovery Mounteer 
could elicit evidence that the findings of facts as stated by t\ 
Court in its order are false. The core of the allegation agains 
UP&L is that its employee slandered and caused intentional 
infliction of emotional distress upon Mounteer while acting 
within the scope of her employment. Absent any factual 
presentations to the Court, the Court must assume under 
Christensen that facts contrary to its findings could be proven 
at trial and should have, therefore, denied a 12(b)(6) Motion fc 
Dismissal if that 12(b)(6) Motion in any way depended upon 
findings of fact which could have been disproven at trial. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST UP&L ARE NOT 
BARRED BY WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT. 
This issue has not been urged by UP&L on appeal and 
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does not appear to have been the basis of the Court's decision. 
However, because of the nature of the case below, brief mention 
should be made of it. 
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act provides that 
compensation benefits shall be paid to "every employee... who is 
injured... by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment..." Utah Code Annotated §35-1-45. The code further 
provides that Workers Compensation should be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer, any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer for such injuries. See Utah Code Annotated 1953 
§35-1-60. However, in this case, the injuries received by 
Mounteer are not those received "by accident" as defined in 
statute or by this Court's recent case of Allen vs. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), or in any of the cases 
following that decision. The injury to Mounteer did not arise 
from any physical contact, strain, exertion or other physical 
cause. The injury to Mr. Mounteer arose solely as a result of 
the mental anguish and exacerbated nervous condition brought 
about by the humiliation and derision that Mounteer was subjected 
to because of the actions of Larsen. Therefore, it does not 
qualify for Workers Compensation relief under either the accident 
provisions or occupational disease provisions. Accordingly, UP&L 
is liable in tort for Larsen's actions. 
The major case in the field is Braman v. Walthall, 225 
S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1949). That case held that the essence of the 
tort defamation is damage to one's reputation, not injury to 
one's physical being as contemplated by the Worker's Compensation 
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Act. Any physiological injury and physical effects as a result 
of the defamation are secondary to the damage to reputation; 
therefore, the defamation action is not barred by the exclusivit 
provision of the act. See, Larson, Workman's Compensation Desk 
Ed., §§68.33 and 68.31. 
In support of its position in the case below, UP&L 
cited a section from Workman's Compensation Law by Walter Larson 
that deals with assault and battery. The cited provision, §68.2. 
at pp. 13-74, starts out with the language "unless the employer 
has commanded or expressly authorized the assault . . . " 
(emphasis added). UP&L ignores the more apropos section of 
Larson, just a few sections later, that deals specifically with 
slander. In this passage, Professor Larson commented on the 
issue of slander as follows: 
Here, as in the case of false imprisonment, 
the only element that introduces any 
possibility of serious controversy is the 
inclusion of physical injury as an element of 
damages. The same comment seems called for: 
the real gist of slander is not personal 
injury. To block the main thrust of the 
action because of this peripheral item, when 
a compensation claim could not purport to 
give relief for the main wrong, would be 
incongruous, and since splitting the cause of 
action is frowned on by courts and certainly 
outside the obvious intent of the 
exclusiveness clause would not be justified 
merely to put the personal injury item into 
the compensation stream, the cause of action 
belongs where its real essence lies, in the 
field of tort. (Emphasis added) 
Larson, supra, § 68.33, pp. 13-26. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below committed manifest error in granting 
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UP&L's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and in holding that UP&L would 
not be liable for its agent's slander and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress unless specifically directed or intended by 
UP&L. Further the Court below committed error in making what 
amounted to Findings of Fact, where no evidence is before the 
Court. This Court should remand this case to the Court below for 
a trial of the issues. 
Appellant further requests this Court to award costs of 
appeal in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 1988. 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State Street, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 533-0222 
M. GALE LEMMON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
i * * •?*• -% 
v . 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
,) -COM 
) 
) F 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* X. * ? * 
if' 
Civil No.jf f 7-s7 7 7 / (Judge * / 
Plaintifff for cause of action, complains and alleges 
against defendant as follows: 
THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant is a public utility and a corporation 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in 
§alt Lake Countyf State of Utah. 
3. Niki Larsenf at all times relevant hereto, was an 
employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office 
of the defendant as Chief of Security. At all times relevant 
hereinf Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of 
defendant UP&L. 
4. At all relevant times hereinf the plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&Ln), 
APPENDIX A 
in its Mining Division. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about October 6, 1986f plaintiff was workinc 
as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Minef in Emery County. 
6. On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a 
substantial, elevated state of stressf caused by the defendant, 
for the following reasons: 
(a) In Decemberf 19 84, at the time of the 
well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at 
the Wilburg Mine. 
(b) Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the 
"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the mine, 
and the plaintiff should shut off the power. 
(c) The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the 
power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive 
of the belt boss. 
(d) As a result of the shutting off of power in 
the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the 
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the 
poisonous air out of the mine. 
(e) Plaintiff attempted to consult with various 
management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a 
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power 
turned off to the mine. In additionf several months after the 
disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the 
front gate of the mine. In this position, he was required to 
interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners. 
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(f) Because of the great strain caused by these 
activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel 
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company. 
(g) On one occasion, he was told by Gene Shockey 
President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families 
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the compan; 
to these people. 
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this 
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal 
life. 
7. While the plaintiff was in this agitated state, 
defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on 
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an 
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly 
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the 
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another 
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the 
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make 
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs. 
8. The allegations were totally false. 
9. Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been 
instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to 
investigate the plaintiff for drug use. UP&L had specific 
procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of 
drug use. 
10. Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false 
allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional 
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damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric 
hospital for treatment. 
11. Plaintiff has sustained, as a result of the 
actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled 
from employment. 
12. Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs 
and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the 
future. 
13. At the time of defendant's actions in this case, 
plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year. Since 
the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is 
not expected to work in the future. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Slander -
14. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
15. The statement made by the defendant's agent was 
false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on 
drugs when such was not the case. 
16. The publication of the defamatory statement by 
Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the 
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in 
any event. 
17. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent. 
18. Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his 
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psychological, mental and emotional wellbeingr including but not 
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and 
depression. In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently 
damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally 
disabled. He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will 
have substantial future costs. 
19. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because 
of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the 
conduct involved. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress -
20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
21. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agent, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which 
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to 
the plaintiff. 
22. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress -
23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
24. In the alternative, and in the event that the 
actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor 
reckless, then the defendant's actions were negligent. 
25. Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, 
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and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. 
26. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13f 18 and 19 above. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant 
as follows: 
1. For judgment for slander, in the amount of 
$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total 
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder. 
2. For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved 
at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering, 
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at 
trial. 
3. For medical expenses in such an amount as 
plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in 
the future. 
4. In the event that any defense is raised in bad 
faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees. 
5. For costs of court herein. 
6. For such other relief as the Court may deem just 
in the premises. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987. 
/
 d 
Plaintiff's Address; 
96 East 200 North 
Huntington, UT 84528 
835C 
J*. SYKES ~ // 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. C-87-3791 
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted without 
prejudice. The Court finds as grounds, among others, for the 
granting of summary judgment herein that Utah Power & Light is 
not vicariously liable for the acts of its employee herein; that 
said acts of said employee were in violation of policy of the 
employer; that Utah Power & Light is not liable for defamatory 
statements made by one of its employees against another, unless 
the employee was directed to make said statements, which she was 
not in this case; and that Utah law does not recognize a cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Defendant's attorneys will draft the Order. 
-n-Dated this _day o 
DISTRICT CC 
I
 u ATTEST 
H. D3XON HINDLEY 
. CLERK 
By &VZ, 
APPENDIX 
MOUNTEER V. UP&L PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this /£> day of August, 1987: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 S. State, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert Gordon 
Paul H. Proctor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
,V\77Tip 
ROBERT GORDON, #1221 
PAUL H. PROCTOR, #2657 
Attorneys for 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 535-4256 
RLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
SEP 2-2-1987 
H. Dixon Hind^ 
By 
itey, <^rKaru_pist. Court 
\\ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Plaintiff, 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO., 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 87-3791 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
By Motion dated July 22, 1987, Utah Power & Light Company 
moved the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12, U.R.C.P., which Motion was supported by a Memoranda of 
Authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition. The Motion was orally 
argued before the Court on July 31, 1987, at which time it was. 
taken under advisement. On August 3, 1987, the plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition and in addition, filed a 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint together with the 
proposed Amended Complaint. 
On August 17, 1987, having fully considered all pleadings 
filed by the parties and the oral argument, the Court issued its 
APPENDIX 
Minute Entry, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto. 
NOW THEREFORE, in accordance with the Minute Entry, the 
Court enters the following findings and grounds for the judgment: 
1. Utah Power & Light Company is not vicariously liable 
for the acts alleged herein of its employee Nickie Larsen. 
2. The acts of Nickie Larsen in knowingly communicating on 
an open-page system connected to loudspeakers to many of Utah 
Power & Light Company's other employees the allegation that the 
plaintiff was on drugs was in violation of the policy of Nickie 
Larsenfs employer, Utah Power & Light Company. 
3. Utah Power & Light Company is not liable for defamatory 
statements made by its employee against the plaintiff, a co-
employee, unless Utah Power & Light Company directed the employee 
to make the defamatory statements. 
4. Utah Power & Light Company did not direct its employee 
Nickie Larsen to make the defamatory statements. 
5. Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
this action should be and is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this _J2£Z^day of September 1987. 
BY THE^C0URT: 
lOTHlffHoffat 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDL6Y 
CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the parties listed below by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addresse 
to: 
Robert Gordon 
Paul H. Proctor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
and by hand delivering the same this 19th day of January, 1988. 
\ Ai / _ 
Attorney for Appellant 
.835/BRIEF 
Approved as to form: 
/l 
Rdbert B. SyKfeS, Esq. 
M. Gale Lemmbn, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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